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H I G H L I G H T S
 Interconnector counter-trading reduces the system marginal price in the SEM.
 Dispatch-down of wind power is reduced due to interconnector counter-trading.
 A 5% increase in the SNSP limit can reduce wind power dispatched-down by 50%.
 An increase in the SNSP limit and installed wind capacity reduces the SMP.
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a b s t r a c t
Throughout the European Union there is an increasing amount of wind generation being dispatched-
down due to the binding of power system operating constraints from high levels of wind generation. This
paper examines the impact a system non-synchronous penetration limit has on the dispatch-down of
wind and quantiﬁes the signiﬁcance of interconnector counter-trading to the priority dispatching of wind
power. A fully coupled economic dispatch and security constrained unit commitment model of the Single
Electricity Market of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the British Electricity Trading and
Transmission Arrangement was used in this study. The key ﬁnding was interconnector counter-trading
reduces the impact the system non-synchronous penetration limit has on the dispatch-down of wind.
The capability to counter-trade on the interconnectors and an increase in system non-synchronous pe-
netration limit from 50% to 55% reduces the dispatch-down of wind by 311 GW h and decreases total
electricity payments to the consumer by €1.72/MW h. In terms of the European Union electricity market
integration, the results show the importance of developing individual electricity markets that allow
system operators to counter-trade on interconnectors to ensure the priority dispatch of the increasing
levels of wind generation.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The installed wind capacity in Europe has been steadily in-
creasing and as of the end of 2013 it was 117.3 GW (EWEA, 2014).
This signiﬁcant quantity of wind capacity has meant a number of
European Union (EU) countries were supplying more than 15% of
their 2013 national demand from wind power (International En-
ergy Agency, 2014). Holttinen et al. (2009) showed some EU
countries had wind generation providing more than 50% of the
instantaneous peak demand in 2008. The growing penetration of
wind generation is resulting in wind power being dispatched-
down due to curtailment and constraint issues. In 2012, the ma-
jority of wind dispatched-down in Spain (148 GW h) and Germany
(385 GW h) was due to constraints on the transmission and dis-
tribution network (Steurer et al., 2014). Whereas in the SEM,
106 GW h of wind was dispatched-down with an estimated 62%
from curtailment issues and 38% from network constraints (Eir-
Grid, 2014). As the installed wind capacity in Europe is expected to
increase to somewhere between 165 GW and 216 GW in 2020
(EWEA, 2014), the percentage of peak demand provided by wind
generation will increase as will the dispatch-down of wind
generation.
In order to promote the integration of high levels of renewable
energy into electricity markets the European Commission (EC)
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adopted the renewable energy sources directive (European Com-
mission, 2009). The directive stated system operators must give
priority to renewable energy generators when scheduling the
generator portfolio, as far as the system security permits. In the EU
target model, the coupled day ahead market (DAM) implements
the priority dispatching when determining the economic dispatch
schedule and cross border trading on the interconnectors. The
increasing levels of wind generation in the EU could result in
periods where the DAM schedules wind generation to supply high
percentages of instantaneous system demand leading to system
security and stability issues (Foley et al., 2013). Such instances will
result in the system operator modifying the DAM dispatch sche-
dules and curtailing wind generation. The difference between the
DAM schedules and the dispatch schedules produced by a system
operator can be signiﬁcant as seen in the results of Denny et al.
(2010) and Mcgarrigle et al. (2013). Denny et al. (2010) used an
unconstrained unit commitment model of the Single Electricity
Market (SEM), similar to a DAM, which produced an economic
dispatch schedule that resulted in very little wind curtailment and
constraints. However, an analysis of the dispatch schedules by
Mcgarrigle et al. (2013) showed when system operational con-
straints are applied in the SEM a signiﬁcant amount of wind cur-
tailment occurs. Only in suitable electricity markets do system
operators have the ability to counter-trade the interconnector ﬂow
when ensuring priority dispatching of renewable generation (En-
tso-E, 2012). A suitable electricity market is one that allow system
operators to trade upwards and downwards on both sides of the
interconnector, such as the Balancing Market in Nordpool (Entso-
E, 2012). Counter trading is when the system operator trades
counter to the ﬂow on the interconnector. Interconnector counter-
trading could reduce the amount of wind curtailed in system
constrained electricity markets by reducing imports or increasing
exports during periods of wind curtailment.
The hypothesis of the work is to examine the importance of
interconnector counter-trading to a system operator in a security
constraint electricity market. In the EU target model the inter-
connector schedules are determined through the unconstrained
day ahead market. When the system operator applies the system
operating constraints the ability to counter-trade the inter-
connector ﬂows could be crucial. The Single Electricity Market
(SEM) of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is used as a
case study as the SEM had one of the highest penetrations of wind
power supplying electricity demand in Europe in 2013 (Interna-
tional Energy Agency, 2014). It is a small electricity market where
cross border interconnections are important to the system stabi-
lity, security of supply and reducing price volatility (Nepal and
Jamasb, 2012). More importantly the SEM currently has an
agreement to counter trade on the interconnectors with the sys-
tem operator of the British Electricity Trading and Transmission
Arrangement (BETTA) market (EirGrid, 2013a). The test system
developed in this paper is the ﬁrst of its kind, known to the au-
thors, to model both the day-ahead and dispatch schedules
through a combined economic dispatch unconstrained unit com-
mitment day-ahead model and security constrained unit com-
mitment intra-day model. The paper presents the impact that
interconnector counter-trading in the SEM in 2016 has on the
dispatch-down of wind, interconnector scheduling and the
wholesale price of electricity. A 2016 model was analysed as the
SEM market structure will change in 2017 to comply with the EU
target model. There is limited research into the I-SEM structure as
it is still in development. This research highlights the importance
of implementing interconnector counter-trading into the new
I-SEM. In a wider EU context, the results from this work highlight
the requirement to develop the necessary European market
structure to accommodate system operator to system operator
interconnector counter-trading in the balancing market. This
paper is organised as follows. Section one introduces the issue of
wind power dispatch-down and interconnection in the SEM. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the test system, validation and methodology used
in this study. Section 3 presents the results and discussions and
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Methodology and test system
2.1. Test system background and architecture
A test system of the SEM in 2016 was built to accurately analyse
wind power generation and dispatch-down. The operation of the
SEM is an iterative process between SEM operator (SEMO) and the
system operators, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Twenty four hours before the intra-day plant owners bid into
the SEM commercial offer data and technical offer data for each
half hour interval in the intra-day. The commercial offer data and
technical offer data contain price/quantity bids, start-up costs and
no load costs. SEMO uses this generator data and produces the
most economic dispatch (ED) schedule. The model used to develop
the ED is an unconstrained unit commitment (UUC) model as it
does not include transmission constraints. This model is replicated
by the SEM Ex-Ante model in Fig. 1. The trading and settlement
code for the SEM states the scheduling of the interconnectors must
be performed in the Ex-Ante market 24 h before the trading per-
iod (SEMO, 2014a). Therefore the most important output of the ED
is the interconnector ﬂows across the Moyle and East–West (EW)
interconnectors.
The purpose of the system operator is to ensure system security
and stability of the SEM and to achieve this the system operator
applies system operating constraints (SOCs) and reserves re-
quirements to the electricity system. The constraints ensure sys-
tem inertia and frequency are always maintained by scheduling a
number of speciﬁc generators on at key locations in the SEM. The
reserve constrained unit commitment/security constrained unit
commitment (RCUC/SCUC) model of the test system replicates the
Fig. 1. SEM and BETTA test system.
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activities of the system operator. The RCUC/SCUC analysis is run
24 h before the trading period, similar to the Ex-Ante analysis. The
RCUC/SCUC model is run in parallel with a dispatch quantity (DQ)
model. The main difference between the models is that the RCUC/
SCUC has a wind forecast proﬁle whereas the DQ has a wind
generated proﬁle. The two models are ‘interleaved’ which means
the DQ model re-optimises the RCUC/SCUC dispatch schedules
taking into account the new DQ wind generation proﬁle. The ad-
dition of the DQ model enables the inclusion of wind and load
forecast error to the electricity system. The optimisation settings
and scenarios of each model in the test system are highlighted in
Fig. 2.
The system operators manage system stability and ensure
supply matches demand by rescheduling generating units and
lastly priority dispatch units. The system operators in the SEM
have an order list of units to be rescheduled and interconnector
counter-trading is highlighted as the ﬁrst action to be carried out
to ensure priority dispatching (CER and NIAUR, 2011). Inter-
connector counter-trading involves rescheduling the day-ahead
interconnector ﬂows before the trading period. Counter-trading
provides the system operator with the ability to reduce imports
and increase exports in order to reduce the amount of wind being
dispatched-down. Oggioni and Smeers (2013) state “grid lines are
overloaded and TSOs have to restore grid feasibility by reshufﬂing
power ﬂows among energy market participants (producers/con-
sumers)”. This is the so called counter-trading or re-dispatching
function. In order not to mix up the deﬁnitions used by SEM sys-
tem operator and Oggioni and Smeers (2013), in this research
counter-trading is used to discuss the changing of interconnector
schedules from the energy market to ensure priority dispatching.
Whereas the re-dispatching of generators is performed by the
RCUC/SCUC model when the system operating constraints are
applied.
The last step in the operation of the SEM is replicated by the
Ex-Post model. The market operator UUC model (Ex-Post) uses the
DQ wind generation and interconnector ﬂows and re-optimises
the ED to calculate the system marginal price (SMP) for the SEM.
The SMP from the Ex-Post is paid to the electricity generators and
charged to the electricity suppliers. Constraint payments, capacity
payments and Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) payments
are added to the SMP. Constraint payments are payments or
charges to generators that are constrained off/on due to the SOCs.
Capacity payments are for generating units that provide available
capacity. The annual capacity payment sum was assumed to be
€574,953,600, the same as in 2015 (CER and NIAUR, 2014). The
REFIT is a subsidy payment for renewable energy generating units.
The combination of both the system and market operation
must be modelled to accurately investigate any scenario on the
SEM. The results from the RCUC/SCUC and DQ models are used to
analyse system operation impacts whereas results from the Ex-
Ante and Ex-Post models are used to analyse market implications.
In the SEM the dispatch-down of wind is broken into ‘constrained’
and ‘curtailed’. Wind constrained occurs when interconnectors
and transmission lines are operating at full capacity and genera-
tion from wind farms is reduced. Wind curtailment occurs when
wind generation is reduced so that the system operator can ensure
system security through system operating constraints such as a
minimum number of generators, generators operating at mini-
mum stable levels (MSLs) and a system non-synchronous pene-
tration (SNSP) limit.
2.2. SEM and BETTA unit commitment modelling
The SEM model was built using 2013 datasets for the base case
(CER and NIAUR, 2013), but before extending the model to 2016 it
was fully validated against real data from (SEMO, 2014b). The SEM
is a wholesale mandatory electricity pool market consisting of 77
different generating units buying and selling into a single node.
The market operator models (ExAnte and Ex-Post) of the SEM test
system were built as a single node. The system operator models
(RCUC/SCUC and DQ) separated the SEM into two nodes, the Re-
public of Ireland and Northern Ireland, with a tie-line (North–
South) connecting both nodes. All the generators were attached to
their respective node. The models included two interconnectors to
the BETTA market, the Moyle and EW. The Moyle interconnector
was between Northern Ireland and Scotland, and the EW inter-
connector linked Ireland to Wales. Both interconnectors had a
ramp rate of 300 MW/h (SEMO, 2014c). A wheeling charge of €3/
MW h was applied to both interconnectors. The reason for the two
nodes in the system operator models is to replicate the running of
the two electricity systems on the island by the difference system
operators, EirGrid in the Republic of Ireland and SONI in Northern
Ireland.
The validation results of the market and system operation
Fig. 2. Model characteristics.
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models are shown in Fig. 3 and Table 1. The average SMP, calcu-
lated from the Ex-Post model, for each hour of the day was cal-
culated and compared to the real results published on the SEMO
website (SEMO, 2014b). There is a close correlation between the
model results and the real data across all hours of the day. The
average SMPs for the year for the model and published SEMO data
were €65.74/MW h and €61.77/MW h respectively. A comparison
of the generation for the top 15 generating units from published
SEMO data and the DQ model is shown in Table 1. The average for
the absolute error of the top 15 generating units is 15.4%, see Eq.
(1). There is also an element of human interaction from the system
operator when determining the DQ which can affect the accuracy
of the DQ results
N
DQ SEMO
1
j j j1
N ( )∑ −
( )
=
where DQj is the total dispatched generation in 2013 produced by
the test system for generator j, SEMOj is the total dispatched
generation in 2013 from SEMO for the generatorj, N is the number
of generators.
The BETTA test system was developed using the National Grid’s
Electricity 10 Year Statement that split Great Britain into 17 ‘zones’,
Z1 to Z17 (National Grid, 2013). Each ‘zone’ has a node with all the
generating units in that zone connected to the node. All 127
generators are modelled (National Grid, 2014a). The nodes were
connected to each other through lines that represent the trans-
mission lines of the National Grid in the BETTA. National Grid's
seven year statement identiﬁed boundary interfaces between the
zones and the max capacities of each boundary interface (National
Grid, 2011). The schematic of the combined BETTA and SEM test
system is shown in Fig. 4. The BETTA has two models, the Over the
Counter (OTC) model that replicates the forward trading and the
Balancing Market that replicates the spot market. The two differ-
ences between both models are the look ahead and the removal of
the bilateral constraint, which is discussed in Section 2.5. The OTC
model of the BETTA is combined with the Ex-Ante of the SEM and
the Balancing Market is combined with the Ex-Post, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. The validation of the BETTA model involved comparing
the generation from the Balancing Market model with published
data from ELEXON (2014), the BETTA market operator. Table 2
highlights the generation by fuel type for the OTC model, Balan-
cing Market model and the ELEXON data. The addition of the
balancing market enabled the inclusion of wind and load forecast
error on BETTA generation. The Balancing Market model has good
correlation with ELEXON. The private information for each power
plant such as start-up costs, heat rates and variable operating and
maintenance (VOM) charges are difﬁcult to obtain, as a result it is
likely to have some degree of difference between the results from
the test system and published data. VOM charges are used to re-
cover maintenance costs from wear and tear and values for the
BETTA model were sourced from Mcdonald (2010).
2.3. Baseline test system
The 2016 SEM and BETTA generator portfolio load demands
were estimated using datasets from National Grid (2014a) and
EirGrid and SONI (2014b). The installed wind capacity of the SEM
in 2016 was forecasted to increase to 2827 MW and 695 MW for
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland respectively. The
BETTA onshore and offshore wind was separated into zones as
deﬁned by National Grid’s Seven Year Statement study zones
(National Grid, 2013). The capacity factor for each wind zone was
determined from (DECC, 2013). The National Grid's wind genera-
tion time series for 2011 was scaled, accordingly, to achieve the
2016 targets (National Grid, 2013). The time series data was used
as BETTA onshore wind. The capacity factor of each zone is
Fig. 3. 2013 SEM market model validation.
Table 1
SEM system model validation.
DQ – 2011
Unit DQ (GW h) SEMO (GW h) % Difference GW h difference
DB1 2628.55 2362.95 10% 265.60
C30 2481.62 2325.20 6% 156.40
HN2 1959.04 1968.63 1% 9.60
PBC 994.01 1365.92 37% 371.90
TYC 968.43 920.51 5% 47.90
HNC 1019.55 1270.53 25% 251.00
MP3 606.87 1108.68 83% 501.80
MP1 986.43 970.85 2% 15.60
B32 805.42 859.29 7% 53.90
B31 885.41 872.13 2% 13.30
MP2 735.5 981.03 33% 245.50
ADC 2139.38 1090.05 49% 1049.30
WG 2060.82 1956.55 5% 104.30
ED1 709.7 662.52 7% 47.20
LR4 605.21 609.28 1% 4.10
WO4 434.49 431.15 1% 3.30
SK4 530.58 543.23 2% 12.70
SK3 457.22 471.04 3% 13.80
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different therefore the wind data ﬁles were adjusted accordingly
(DECC, 2014). Foley et al. (2009) showed that the BETTA onshore
wind data time lagged the SEM onshore wind data by two hours.
The SEM offshore wind data preceded SEM onshore by one hour.
Offshore wind in the BETTA was time adjusted by an hour de-
pending onwhether the zone is to the east or west of Great Britain.
Any zone with offshore wind to the east time lagged BETTA on-
shore wind by an hour and any zone to the west proceeded BETTA
onshore wind by an hour.
2.4. Objective function
A similar set-up to Higgins and Foley (2014) was used for this
research. The test system was developed using Energy Exemplar’s
PLEXOS for Power Systems version 6.301R02 (Energy Exemplar,
2013) and the Xpress optimiser (Fico Xpress Optimiser, 2013). The
optimisation settings for each model of the test system were dif-
ferent, as shown in Fig. 2. The optimiser aims to minimise the
objective function (Deane, 2012) shown in Eq. (2). The objective
function considers the start-up costs, no load costs, variable op-
eration and maintenance charge, and use of system charge for
each plant. The objective function is conditional an energy bal-
ancing constraint (Eq. (3)) and a number of unit operational con-
straints; ramping constraints (Eq. (4), Eq. (5)), max capacity (Eq.
(6)) and minimum stable generation (Eq. (7)) constraints
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟
P
P
min
SC US NLC UG VOM UoS
PC PenLL UE PenLL RES PDE ExE 2t T j J
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt tjt
( )∑ ∑ · + · + + ·
+ · + · + · + · ( )∈ ∈
P DPload UE
3t T j J
jt jt t t( )∑ ∑ − + =
( )∈ ∈
P P MRU UG 0 4jt jt jt jt1− − · ≤ ( )−
P P MRD UG 0 5jt jt jt jt1− + · ≥ ( )−
P Pmax UG 0 6jt jt jt( )− · ≤ ( )
P MSL UG 0 7jt jt jt( )− · ≥ ( )
where t indexes time periods in chronological order t¼1,…,T, j
indexes generators in chronological order j¼1,…,J, SCjt is the start
cost of unit j in period t, USjt is a binary quantity representing if
unit j has started the period before t, NLCjt is the no load cost of
Fig. 4. SEM and BETTA test system.
Table 2
BETTA validation.
ELEXON OTC market Balancing market
Gas (CCGT) 126,958 121,078 126,412
Gas (OCGT) 24 1823 2008
Oil 12 29 29
Coal 103,459 102,174 100,040
Nuclear 64,733 68,766 66,002
Pumped Storage 2917 1102 –
GB Hydro 2011 3693 3593 3517
GB Wind 2011 9716 9428 9202
Total 311,512 307,992 307,210
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unit j, UGjt is a binary quantity representing the generating status
of unit j, VOMjt is the variable operation and maintenance charge
of unit j, UoSjt is the Use of system charge for generation of unit j,
PCjt is the production cost of unit j, Pjt is the power output of unit j,
PenLL is the penalty for loss load, UEt is the unserved energy in
period t, RESt is the reserve not met by unit j, PDE is the penalty for
energy that is dumped, ExEt is the excess energy of unit j, Ploadjt is
the pump load of unit j, Dt is the system demand, MRUjt is the
maximum ramp up rate of unit j, MRDjt is the maximum ramp
down rate of unit j, Pmaxjt is the power output of unit j and MSLjt
is the power output of unit j.
The BETTA test system had a constraint included that requires
the ‘Big 6’ energy companies (i.e. Centrica, EDF, E.ON, RWE, Scot-
tish Power and SSE) in the BETTA to attempt to fulﬁl their supply
demands from their own generator portfolio and if they cannot a
penalty price is accrued. If the following constraint was violated
than a penalty price was charged
CompGen Load MS 0 8i BETTA i( ) ( )∑ − · ≥ ( )
where CompGeni is the total generation for company i, LoadBetta is
the system demand for the BETTA and MSi is the market share of
demand for company i. Munoz and Bunn (2013) identiﬁed a 20%
mark-up for generating units to replicate the market behaviour,
however in this study the above constraint and a 5% mark-up were
modelled. The gaming in the BETTA market is difﬁcult to replicate
and therefore the assumptions described are attempt to predict
the marginal pricing of the BETTA market.
2.5. System operating constraints and reserve requirements
In 2012, the SEM system operators recorded periods when 50%
of system demand and 38% of daily electricity demand were met
by wind generation (EirGrid, SEMO, SONI, 2012). The system op-
erators established the SNSP limit to maintain system stability by
restricting the amount of renewable generation on the system. The
SNSP is a measure of the non-synchronous generation on the
system at any time. It is a ratio of non-synchronous generation (i.e.
onshore wind, offshore wind, wave and tidal) and imports to de-
mand and exports. In 2011, the SNSP limit was expected to be set
at 65% by 2017 and 75% by 2020 (EirGrid, SONI, SEMO, 2013b).
However, the most recent information from the system operators
is the SNSP limit may be set at 55% by 2017 (SEM Committee,
2014). Mcgarrigle et al. (2013) also showed that a low SNSP limit
can have signiﬁcant impacts on wind curtailment in the SEM in
2020. The difference between 75% and 60% in SNSP limit was
shown to increase wind curtailment from 7% to 14%. A study by the
system operators in Ireland found a maximum 5% wind curtail-
ment was desired in the SEM to ensure a system security and
reliability (EirGrid and SONI, 2011). The formulation for SNSP is
Non synchronous Imports
Demand Exports
55%
9
gen− +
+
≤
( )
The system operators in the SEM have developed a number of
other constraints to ensure a certain level of system inertia and
frequency across the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The
SOCs for Northern Ireland are system stability (Eq. (10)), replace-
ment reserve (Eq. (11)), Northwest generation (Eq. (12)), Kilroot
generation (Eq. (13)), Ballylumford generation (Eq. (14)). The SOCs
for the Republic of Ireland are system stability (Eq. (15)), re-
placement reserve (Eq. (16)), Dublin generation (Eq. (17)), Dublin
North generation (Eq. (18)), Dublin South generation (Eq. (19)),
Southwest generation (Eq. (20)), Cork generation (Eq. (21)) and
Moneypoint (Eq. (22))
UGSOC 3
10t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
PSOC 211
11t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
UGSOC 1
12t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
UGSOC 2
13t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
PSOC 1344
14t T
jt( )∑ ≤
( )∈
UGSOC 5
15t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
PSOC 493
16t T
jt( )∑ ≤
( )∈
UGSOC 2
17t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
UGSOC 1
18t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
UGSOC 1
19t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
UGSOC 2
20t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
PSOC 1100
21t T
jt( )∑ ≤
( )∈
UGSOC 1
22t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
where UGSOCjt is a binary quantity representing the generating
status of the unit j listed for system stability, replacement reserve,
north west generation, Kilroot generation, Ballylumford genera-
tion, Dublin generation, Dublin North generation, Dublin South
generation, Southwest generation, Cork generation or Moneypoint
and PSOCjt is the power output of unit j listed for system stability,
replacement reserve, north west generation, Kilroot generation,
Ballylumford generation, Dublin generation, Dublin North gen-
eration, Dublin South generation, Southwest generation, Cork
generation or Moneypoint.
The system operators use a number of system services to
maintain system security such as operating reserves, replacement
reserve and steady-state reactive power (EirGrid, 2014). In this test
system the operating reserves and replacement reserves were
modelled. The primary (Eq. (23)), secondary (Eq. (24)), tertiary 1
(Eq. (25)) and tertiary 2 (Eq. (26)) operating reserves were
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modelled with a static value of 75% of the largest all island in-feed,
which is the EW interconnector (500 MW). A maximum reserve
response for each generator was applied depending on the max
capacity of the generator. A negative reserve of 50 MW and
100 MW for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland respec-
tively was included in the RCUC/SCUC models of the SEM
RES 375
23t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
RES 500
24t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
RES 50
25t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
RES 100
26t T
jt( )∑ ≥
( )∈
where RESjt is the operating or negative reserve provide by unit j.
The transmission line constraints for the BETTA were applied
through boundary interfaces between the different zones (Na-
tional Grid, 2011). The BETTA system operator, National Grid,
produces a yearly report on the short term operating reserve
(STOR) highlighting the units that provide STOR by fuel type and
quantity (National Grid, 2014b). National Grid states the quantity
of STOR required is approximately 2300 MW with a minimum
value of 1800 MW (National Grid, 2014b). The reserve constraint
was modelled through Eq. (27)
1800 RES 2300
27t T
jt( )∑≤ ≤
( )∈
2.6. Methodology
A total of 13 scenarios were developed to examine the impact
interconnector counter-trading had on the dispatch-down of wind
in 2016, as listed in Table 3. Scenarios 1–9 were used to examine
the impact of the SNSP limits and installed wind capacity (IWC)
had on the dispatch-down of wind, interconnector counter-trading
and the SMP. Scenarios 1–3 and 10–12 were compared to de-
termine the effect the Moyle interconnector capacity could have
on the SEM. Scenario 2 and scenario 13 were compared to de-
termine the impact counter-trading had on the system and market
operations.
EirGrid et al. (2014) identiﬁed locations on the island where
network constraints are occurring that result in the dispatch-down
of wind. The test system used in this research is a unit commit-
ment model that does not include the outages and overloading
effects of the transmission and distribution network when ana-
lysing wind constraints. Since the network constraints are not
recorded the amount of wind constrained could be slightly un-
derestimated. The amount of wind curtailed could be slightly
overestimated as wind power could be network constrained be-
fore the SNSP limits binds. The wind constrained in this work is
only from congestion on the interconnectors.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Dispatch-down of wind
The total amount of wind dispatched-down for scenario 2 by
hour of the day is shown in Fig. 5. Scenario 2 was examined as it is
expected to be the most likely to occur as the installed wind ca-
pacity in 2016 is expected to be 3522 MW and the system opera-
tors have predicted the SNSP limit will be 55%. The dispatch-down
of wind was broken into wind constrained due to the Moyle and
EW interconnectors operating at full capacity and wind curtailed
due to the MSLs of the scheduled generators and the SNSP limit.
Some of the SOCs, such as the system stability and South West
generation, require a minimum number of generators to be on
load to provide system security through inertia and frequency
control. The system operators have the choice to select from a list
of generators to provide the SOCs. Therefore at some periods the
minimum number of generators might consist of different gen-
erators. For scenario 2, the average MSL of the minimum number
of generators is 1435 MW, with a maximum and minimum of
1719 MW and 1356 MW. From 12 am to 4 am the average system
demand is approximately 3108 MW, with a minimum of
2408 MW. The difference between the system demand and the
MSLs results in an average of 1400 MW of demand that wind
generation and interconnector imports can supply. Fig. 5 illustrates
from 12 am to 4 am the minimum number of generators that are
operating at their MSLs, the system demand is at its lowest for the
day and the interconnectors have been counter-traded to schedule
as much wind generation as possible, however wind generation
still has to be curtailed. The system operator is attempting to in-
troduce new system services that will improve system security
and remove a number of SOCs which should reduce the amount of
wind curtailment during these periods (EirGrid, SEMO, SONI,
2012).
Outside of 12 am to 6 am the SNSP limit is the most inﬂuential
factor to the dispatch-down of wind. At periods where wind
generation is to be dispatched-down the priority dispatch process
reduces peat generators to their minimum stable levels, hydro
generation is reduced, the interconnectors are counter-traded
from their Ex-Ante schedule and the last step is to reduce wind
generation. The wind curtailed due to the SNSP limit occurs when
the priority dispatch process has already taken place and the last
option is to reduce wind generation.
Previously the system operator could not change the day-ahead
interconnector schedule it received from SEMO, see Ex-Ante in
Fig. 1. However, the system operator now has the ability to
counter-trade an interconnector schedule once the ramp rate of
300 MW/h is not exceeded in either direction. The system operator
can only counter-trade when priority dispatching is required.
Scenario 2 results in 172 GW h of wind being dispatched-down
which equates to 2.9% of wind available. The ability of the system
operator to counter-trade the Ex-Ante interconnector schedule
reduces the dispatch-down of wind by a maximum of 855 GW h. It
has been identiﬁed by the system operator that anything above 5%
Table 3
List of scenarios.
Scenario Description
1 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼50%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
2 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼55%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
3 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼60%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
4 IWC¼3738 MW/SNSP limit¼50%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
5 IWC¼3738 MW/SNSP limit¼55%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
6 IWC¼3738 MW/SNSP limit¼60%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
7 IWC¼4022 MW/SNSP limit¼50%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
8 IWC¼4022 MW/SNSP limit¼55%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
9 IWC¼4022 MW/SNSP limit¼60%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
10 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼50%/Moyle interconnector¼250 MW
11 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼55%/Moyle interconnector¼250 MW
12 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼60%/Moyle interconnector¼250 MW
13 IWC¼3522 MW/SNSP limit¼55%/Moyle interconnector¼430 MW
(No interconnector counter-trading)
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of wind being dispatched-down is undesirable and could have an
impact on the installation of wind turbines. Therefore the ability
for the system operator to counter-trade is vital to ensure
dispatch-down of wind remains below 5% in 2016. Similar to the
dispatch-down of wind, counter-trading occurs the most during
12am to 4am. Once both interconnectors are operating at their
Fig. 5. Total annual dispatch-down of wind per hour of day (Scenario 2).
Fig. 6. Total counter-trading per hour of day (Scenario 2).
Fig. 7. Dispatch-down of wind due to SNSP limit (Scenarios 1–9).
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max capacities the total annual counter-trading occurs evenly
across both for each hour of the day, as shown in Fig. 6.
The SNSP limit in 2016 depends on the ability of the system
operator to implement new system services that can maintain
system stability with increasing levels of non-synchronous gen-
eration. The SNSP limit is expected to rise from 50% to 55% by 2017
but this might not occur if the generators and electricity system
are unable to provide the necessary changes the system operator
requires. The impact the SNSP limit has on the dispatch-down of
wind is illustrated in Fig. 7. A number of installed wind capacity
scenarios were modelled to determine the impact the SNSP limit
could have on the potential wind generation in 2016. The
3522 MW and 3738 MW scenarios represent the 2016 and 2017
installed wind capacities from EirGrid and SONI (2014). The
4022 MW is a more progressive growth in wind generation by
2016. The increase in installed wind capacities from 3522 MW
(scenario 1) to 3738 MW (scenario 4) results in an increase of
586 GW h of available wind generation. From a system operators
perspective approximately 29% (171 GW h) of this extra available
wind generation is dispatched-down. From the perspective of a
wind farm developer/owner, the extra 216 MW of installed wind
capacity will increase curtailment levels from approximately 4% to
6% which is undesirable. A small SNSP increase of 5% has the effect
of reducing dispatch-down of wind by nearly 50% for all installed
wind capacity scenarios. A SNSP limit increase from 50% to 55%
and an installed capacity increase from 3522 MW and 4022 MW
results in the same amount of wind dispatched-down i.e. scenario
2 and scenario 8. Both scenarios experience a dispatch-down of
wind of 427 GW h and 456 GW h respectively that is approxi-
mately 4.5% of the available wind generation, which is just below
the system operator accepted 5%.
The breakdown of wind dispatched-down into constraints due
to the Moyle and EW interconnectors operating at full capacity
and curtailment due to the SNSP limit and the minimum number
of generators running at their MSLs is shown in Fig. 8. For the
lower SNSP limit of 50% the majority of wind dispatch-down is due
to curtailment issues. The SNSP limit for scenarios 1 and 7 cur-
tailed wind generation by 1109 h and 1383 h of the year, respec-
tively. A small increase of 5% in the SNSP limit had the impact of
halving the percentage of available wind generation dispatched-
down for all of the installed wind capacity scenarios. The SNSP
limit is the reason for the majority of wind curtailment for all of
the installed wind capacities when the SNSP limit is 50%. The
higher the installed wind capacity the greater the number of
periods when the SNSP limit is activated and wind is curtailed. The
minimisation of wind dispatched-down is heavily linked to the
ability of the system operator to increase the SNSP limit.
The SEM is a net importer of electricity in 2014 (EirGrid, SEMO,
SONI, 2014) and with the Moyle interconnector at full capacity the
results show approximately 13% of demand in 2016 could be
supplied by imports across the Moyle and EW interconnectors. For
periods of exporting in the Ex-Ante model, the EW interconnector
is scheduled to export more often than the Moyle interconnector
because of the Cheviot transmission constraint on the BETTA,
boundary 6 in Fig. 4. If the ﬂow constrained is in the direction of
Scotland to England, Scotland is a net exporter of electricity and as
a result the Ex-Ante model schedules exports across the EW in-
terconnector to where the demand is in Wales and England. With
more exports across the EW interconnector schedule by the Ex-
Ante model whenever the system operator counter-trades, due to
priority dispatching, the EW interconnector reaches its maximum
capacity more often the Moyle interconnector. Therefore more
wind generation is constrained due to the EW interconnector
operating at maximum capacity than the Moyle interconnector, as
shown in Fig. 8. Wind constrained due to the maximum capacities
of the Moyle and EW interconnectors accounts for nearly 50% of
the dispatch-down of wind when the SNSP limit is 60%. During
these periods, priority dispatching occurs and the interconnector
schedules are at their maximum capacities (430 MW for Moyle
and 500 MW for EW) and counter-trading is implemented.
As installed wind capacity in the SEM increases over the next
few years it is critical that the system operators implement the
required system changes to increase the SNSP limit to at least 55%.
Otherwise there could be an undesirable amount of wind gen-
eration paid for but not used. The current REFIT structure pays the
wind generator €66.35/MW h and a balancing payment of €9.90/
MW h for available wind capacity (DCENR, 2012). A 50% SNSP limit
in 2016, with 3738 MW of installed wind capacity, has 598 GW h
of wind dispatched-down at a potential cost of €39.7 million. An
increase in SNSP limit to 55% reduces dispatch-down of wind to
287 GW h at a potential cost of €19 million.
Fig. 9 illustrates the amount of electricity that is counter-traded
on the interconnectors between the SEM and BETTA for the dif-
ferent installed wind capacities and SNSP limits. Even though
imports and exports across both interconnectors are different the
amount of counter-trading on both interconnectors is similar, as
shown in Fig. 6. An increase in SNSP limit reduces the amount of
periods when dispatch-down of wind occurs as more wind is al-
lowed onto the system. Therefore less counter-trading on the in-
terconnectors occurs for the different installed wind capacity
Fig. 8. Breakdown of the wind dispatched-down of available wind generation (Scenarios 1–9).
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scenarios. The most realistic scenario for 2016 is 3522 MW of in-
stalled wind capacity and a SNSP of 55%. The ability to counter-
trade reduces the amount of wind dispatched-down from 9.37% to
1.79%, therefore decreasing the amount of potential lost REFIT
payments from €56.5 million to €11.5 million.
3.2. Moyle interconnector
For all of the previous scenarios the Moyle interconnector was
operating at its full capacity of 430 MW. The Moyle interconnector
has had a signiﬁcant amount of problems in the past and has been
restricted to 250 MW for large periods of time (EirGrid, 2014).
Scenarios 10–12 with the Moyle interconnector capacity reduced
to 250 MW result in the decreasing of the dispatch-down of wind,
as indicated in Fig. 10. The reason for the decrease is due to the
interaction of the interconnector counter-trading and the SNSP
formula.
For example, on the 23/06/2016 at 17.00 the available wind
generation is 1906 MW and the SEM demand is 3606 MW. If the
Moyle interconnector capacity is 430 MW, SEMO has scheduled
430 MW and 500 MW to be imported across the Moyle and EW
interconnectors respectively. These values result in a SNSP of 77%
for SEMO, as per Eq. (28)
1906 MW 500 MW 430 MW
3606 MW 0 MW
77%
28
+ ( + )
+
= ( )
The system operator counter-trades both interconnectors by
300 MW resulting in 130 MW and 200 MW of imports across the
Moyle and EW interconnectors respectively, as per Eq. (29). With
total imports of 330 MW (130 MWþ200 MW), system demand of
3606 MW and a SNSP limit of 50% the maximum amount of wind
allowed on the system is 1473 MW resulting in a dispatch-down of
433 MW (1906 MW1473 MW), Eq. (30)
1906 MW 200 MW 130 MW
3606 MW 0 MW
62%
29
+ ( + )
+
= ( )
1473 MW 200 MW 130 MW
3606 MW 0 MW
50%
30
+ ( + )
+
= ( )
If on the same period the Moyle interconnector was 250 MW
and SEMO scheduled 250 MW of imports, SEMO's SNSP would be
72%
1906 MW 500 MW 250 MW
3606 MW 0 MW
72%
31
+ ( + )
+
= ( )
The system operator would counter-trade both interconnectors
by 300 MW resulting in the EW interconnector importing 200 MW
Fig. 9. Counter-trading on the SEM/BETTA interconnectors (Scenarios 1–9).
Fig. 10. Dispatch-down of wind due to Moyle interconnector capacity (Scenarios 1–3 and 10–12).
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(500 MW300 MW) but the Moyle interconnector is now ex-
porting 50 MW (250 MW300 MW). The system now experi-
ences a system demand of 3606 MW, imports of 150 MW across
the EW and exports of 50 MW across the Moyle. A 50% SNSP limit
results in a maximum amount of wind allowed on the system of
1628 MW resulting in a dispatch-down of 278 MW (
1906 MW1628 MW)
1906 MW 200 MW
3606 MW 50 MW
57%
32
+
+
= ( )
1628 MW 200 MW
3606 MW 50 MW
50%
33
+
+
= ( )
On the 23/06/2016 at 17.00 am Moyle interconnector capacity
of 450 MW results in 433 MW of dispatched-down wind but a
reduced Moyle interconnector capacity results in a reduced value
of 278 MW of dispatched-down wind. The beneﬁt of increased
interconnector capacity on the dispatch-down of wind depends on
the correlation of an electricity market and a system operator
schedule.
3.3. System marginal price
The current market structure for calculating the SMP requires
SEMO to take the interconnector schedule from the system op-
erator and re-run the market model (Ex-Post). The Ex-Post model
uses the wind generation (without forecast errors) and counter-
traded interconnector schedule to determine the SMP. The Ex-Post
model does not take into account any SOCs, reserve requirements
or SNSP limits. Generators are paid the SMP, constraint payments
and capacity payments. Wind generators are also entitled to REFIT
payments. The total price of electricity for scenario 1 with
3522 MW of installed wind capacity and a SNSP limit of 50% is
presented in Table 4. The REFIT was broken into ‘top-up’ and
dispatched-down payments. A ‘top-up’ payment is the difference
between the SMP and REFIT strike price if a wind generator is
operating. The dispatched-down payment is for wind generators
are dispatched-down and the REFIT structure pays the generators
the SMP at that time. The energy payments are the SEM genera-
tion by the SMP. The price is total payments (i.e. energy payments,
REFIT payments, constraint payments and capacity payments) di-
vided by the generation. The price charged to the customer
(without taxes and proﬁts) consists of 71% from energy payments,
7% from REFIT payments, 2% from constraint payments and 20%
from capacity payments. It must be noted that deﬁning the ca-
pacity payment is beyond the scope of this work and since REFIT
payments to generators are subject to the SMP and capacity pay-
ments, the actually REFIT payments will be lower than estimated
here.
The impact the SNSP limit and installed wind capacity can have
on the SMP in 2016 is presented in Table 5. The SNSP limit has a
greater impact on the SMP than the installed wind capacity. A
change in installed wind capacity from 3522 MW to 3738 MW
results in more wind generation scheduled than an increase in
SNSP limit from 50% to 55%, but it has less of an impact on the
SMP. The higher the SNSP limit the fewer occasions the limit is
reached. Therefore the SEM can schedule more wind generation
and imports resulting in the removal of the more expensive SEM
thermal generators from the merit order. Whereas, if the SNSP
limit remains the same and installed wind capacity increases,
imports are replaced by the extra wind generation which has little
effect on the merit order and as a result the SMP is not changed
substantially.
The total price to the consumer of the SMP including REFIT and
constraint payments is highlighted in Fig. 11. The beneﬁts of SMP
reductions due to the increase in SNSP limits are reduced when
the REFIT and constraint payments are included. Overall the in-
crease in REFIT payments is outweighed by the savings in the SMP
due to the increase in SNSP limit. The scenarios with SNSP limits of
50% and 55% do not produce reductions in SMP when the installed
wind capacities are increased. The reduction in SMP from installed
wind capacities is less than the extra cost in REFIT and constraint
payments. If the SNSP is 60% the installation of extra wind capacity
will not have a negative impact on the price of electricity however
the beneﬁts are less than 1% savings. If the system operator does
not achieve their targets of increasing the SNSP limit in the next
two years the consumer could experience a short term increase in
their bills in order to stay on course for the national targets for
2020.
Scenario 2, with an installed wind capacity of 3522 MW and a
55% SNSP, was used to examine the impact the interconnector
counter-trading has on the SMP. This scenario was tested with and
without the interconnector counter-trading option. The impact
interconnector counter-trading has on the system operator's DQ
and SEMO's MSQ of each fuel type is shown in Fig. 12. The change
in generation is the difference between the dispatch schedules for
scenario 2 and scenario 13. Interconnector counter-trading de-
creases imports and replaces the imports with wind generation
mainly. In the DQ model (system operator) the reduction of
855 GW h of imports due to interconnector counter-trading is met
by an increase in wind generation of 723 GW h and 132 GW h of
thermal generation. The change in thermal generation is a com-
bination of an increase in peat generation and a decrease in gen-
eration from gas and coal from the Republic of Ireland and coal
from Northern Ireland. Peat generation increases because the in-
terconnector counter-trading reduces the amount of priority dis-
patching occurrences and the peat generators are no longer re-
quired to operate at their MSLs. Since the extra wind generation is
predominately used to replace imports and not thermal genera-
tion there is only a small change of €1.507 million (0.15%) in total
generation costs.
The interconnector counter-trading also has an impact on the
unit commitment of the Ex-Post model as there is more wind
generation and different interconnector schedules. Since the Ex-
Post is an UUC model, there is no priority dispatching and there-
fore peat generation is not as affected as in the DQ model. In the
Ex-Post model the difference between the increase in wind gen-
eration and decrease in imports is supplied by generation from gas
and coal from the Republic of Ireland and coal from Northern
Ireland, as seen in Fig. 12.
Table 4
Total price of electricity (Scenario 1).
Energy payments (SMPxGeneration) (million) € 2041.90
REFIT (million) €206.08
Reﬁt top up €191.36
Reﬁt dispatched-down wind €14.72
Constraint payments (million) €55.73
Capacity payment (million) €565.82
Total payments (million) € 2869.53
Generation (GW h) 31776.89
Price (€/MW h) €90.30
Table 5
Impact of SNSP limit and installed wind capacity on SMP.
SNSP limit (%) Installed wind capacity
3522 MW 3738 MW 4022 MW
50 €61.52 €61.10 €61.39
55 €59.35 €59.06 €58.74
60 €58.92 €57.94 €57.70
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In the Ex-Post model the introduction of interconnector coun-
ter-trading decreases imports, increases wind generation and
more expensive thermal generation resulting in the average SMP
for 2016 increasing marginally from €59.33/MW h to €59.35/
MW h. The impact that counter-trading has on the hourly SMP for
an average day in 2016 is displayed in Fig. 13. Mcinerney and Bunn
(2013) found from 2008 to 2010, 26.22% of the ﬂows across the
interconnectors between the SEM and BETTA were against the
price spread direction. From the 2016 test system 19% of the 2016
interconnector ﬂows are against the price spread and increased to
21% when interconnector counter-trading was implemented. The
majority of the ﬂows are the SEM importing when the price spread
should result in exports. Mcinerney and Bunn (2013) have pre-
sented a number of explanations for these anomalies.
The increase in thermal generation and SMP due to the coun-
ter-trading effects on the interconnector results in market energy
payments for the SEM increasing from €1886 million to €1933
million. The increase is due to the increase in generation in the
SEM from 30,550 GW h to 31,406 GW h. The reduction in wind
dispatched-down due to interconnector counter-trading results in
the REFIT decreasing by €21.6 million. The total beneﬁts of inter-
connector counter-trading is realised when all of the payments are
combined as shown in Table 6. For scenario 2 with an installed
wind capacity of 3522 MW and a SNSP limit of 55% the ability to
counter-trade on the interconnector decreases the total price of
electricity per MW h by 1.89% (€1.72/MW h). The ﬁnancial beneﬁts
of interconnector counter-trading are the savings in REFIT
payments.
Over the next few years, changes to subsidy payments for wind
power generation and the new EU energy target model could have
signiﬁcant impacts on the beneﬁts and viability of wind genera-
tion in Northern Europe. The optimised scheduling and counter-
trading of interconnectors will be vital to the delivery of wind
power.
3.4. BETTA
The impact interconnector counter-trading has on the gen-
erating units in the BETTA and the exports to the SEM from the
BETTA can be seen in Fig. 14. The installed wind capacity in the
BETTA is expected to be 7897 MW and 13076 MW in Scotland and
England/Wales respectively. In the test system there was little
wind curtailed in the BETTA market in 2016 for a number of rea-
sons, the signiﬁcant offshore wind planned for Scotland will be
installed after 2016 so the Cheviot boundary is not constraining
signiﬁcant quantities of wind generation in Scotland, the SNSP
limit does not reach 50% and the Moyle interconnector is operat-
ing at its max capacity which means there is extra capacity to
Fig. 11. Impact of SNSP limit and installed wind capacity on Price (Scenario 1–9).
Fig. 12. System operator and SEMO Generation changes due to counter-trading (Scenario 2 and 13).
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export the wind generation.
Fig. 15 shows the change in average generation for the gas, coal
and exports to the SEM due to the interconnector counter-trading.
The majority of the interconnector counter-trading that reduced
the exports to the SEM occurred during the early morning hours.
The coal and gas units were equally affect from 22.00 to 03.00
whereas it is mainly coal generation that is reduced to accom-
modate the decrease in exports to the SEM in the rest of the hours.
At the periods of interconnector counter-trading the coal and gas
generating units are the marginal generators and therefore are the
ﬁrst to be reduced to accommodate the change in interconnector
ﬂow.
The implementation of the SOCs and SNSP in the SEM by the
system operator results in the need for counter-trading on the
interconnector if less wind is to be dispatched-down. As the SEM
is a net importer of electricity the counter-trading results in less
demand required from the BETTA. Therefore the marginal gen-
erators in the BETTA, coal and gas units, are re-scheduled down
resulting in a reduction in the BETTA SMP. In the balancing market
the yearly average SMP of the BETTA is seen to decrease from
d47.01/MW h to d46.91/MW h with the introduction of inter-
connector counter-trading. Opposite to the SEM, the counter-
trading had a reducing effect on the SMP in the BETTA. The cost of
constraint payments are included in the balancing mechanism
where national grid accepts bids and offers from generating units
to increase or decrease generation. Future work will analyse the
unit commitment of the BETTA market with high levels of wind
generation and the impact to the consumer.
4. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper has presented a fully coupled economic dispatch
and security constrained model of the SEM and BETTA test system
and investigated the potential unit commitment issues (i.e. dis-
patch-down of wind, interconnector counter-trading and the
wholesale price of electricity) that could face the SEM in 2016. This
study is the ﬁrst of its kind known to the authors that models the
interaction between the market and system operation in the SEM
that combines fully populated constrained SEM and BETTA mod-
els. In a security constraint electricity market with relatively small
Fig. 13. Average daily SMP.
Table 6
Energy payments.
No counter trading
(Scenrio 13)
Counter trading (Sce-
nario 2)
Energy payments
(million)
€1886.49 €1933.60
REFIT (million) €263.29 €241.70
Reﬁt top up €220.36 €235.74
Reﬁt dispatched down wind €42.93 €5.96
Constraint payments
(million)
€57.69 €55.66
Capacity payment
(million)
€565.82 €565.82
Total payments (million) € 2773.28 € 2796.77
Generation (GW h) 30550.58 31406.05
Price (€/MW h) €90.77 €89.05
Fig. 14. Interconnector counter-trading impact on generation in the BETTA.
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interconnection, counter-trading on the interconnectors is a cru-
cial system service for reducing the dispatch-down of wind. The
results show interconnector counter-trading can reduce the im-
pact a SNSP limit has on the dispatch-down of wind. This is of
particular importance to countries attempting to reach ambitious
renewable energy targets. The ﬁndings from this study will be
used in future work to determine the cost beneﬁt analysis of in-
creased interconnection in a security constrained BETTA market
with signiﬁcant offshore wind capacity.
In order to ensure system stability and security, the system
operator in the SEM identiﬁed the requirement for a limit on the
amount of wind generation that can supply demand. Considering
Ireland is one of the ﬁrst EU countries to experience high pene-
trations of wind power supplying instantaneous peak demands,
such a limit could be introduced in other countries with limited
interconnection. The ability of the system operator to increase the
SNSP limit from 50% is vital to ensure that the dispatch-down of
wind does not increase above 5% of available wind generation. An
increase in SNSP limit from 50% to 55% could reduce the dispatch-
down of wind by 311 GW h saving approximately €20 million in
REFIT payments. Counter-trading on the interconnectors reduces
the impact the SNSP limit has on the dispatch-down of wind as a
decrease in imports was replaced with an increase in wind and
thermal generation. These changes result in the average SMP for
2016 increasing marginally from €59.33/MW h to €59.35/MW h
but the savings in REFIT payments result in a decrease in total
electricity payments to the consumer of €1.72/MW h.
In 2017 the participants of the SEM will see the introduction of
the I-SEM. The structure of the I-SEM means the interconnector
schedules and energy market trading will occur before the system
operator implements the SOCs. If interconnector counter-trading is
not implemented by the system operator, large quantities of wind
generation will be curtailed due to the SNSP limit. Interconnector
counter-trading is a system service that the system operator can
use to ensure priority dispatching and system security. Therefore
the decision to include an interconnector counter-trading option is
crucial to the development of a balancing market in the EU target
model, as it is in the balancing market that system operator to
system operator counter-trading can occur.
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